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1 June 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director

Deputy Director

Deputy Director (Plans)

Deputy Director (Administration)

Assistant Directors

FROM:

Assistant Director, Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT:

Proposals Regarding Requirements

ENCLOSURE:

TAB A - Proposed Terms of Reference for a CIA

Requirements Committee

- 1. In order to clarify the issue and focus the responsibility for the coordination of Requirements, the following proposals are submitted for consideration:
 - a. That the Office of Intelligence Coordination should be made responsible for:
 - (1) providing the coordination necessary in developing general requirements guidance for collection facilities within CIA and those in other agencies;
 - (2) assisting, where appropriate, in reconciling difficulties which develop in the course of handling ad hoc or spot requirements as provided for in Regulation p. 13 (functional statement of the Office of Collection and Dissemination).

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- b. That there should be established a CIA Requirements Committee to assist the AD/IC in discharging the responsibilities set forth in Paragraph a. above. Proposed Terms of Reference are attached as TAB A.
- 2. Consideration has been given to the establishment of a Requirements Committee or Board which would include representatives of all the IAC agencies. After discussion within CIA, however, it has been agreed that such an extension of the Committee's scope and membership should be deferred to a later date.

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PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A CIA REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE

- 1. The Committee shall include representatives of the collecting and producing offices of CIA.
- 2. The Chairman of the Committee shall be the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination, acting for the Director.
 - 3. The functions of the Committee shall be as follows:
 - a. To formulate initially priority listings of national intelligence requirements by country and/or subject such as would be required to implement (see

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- b. To develop, as requested by the offices represented, guide type requirements other than those in paragraph 3 a.
- c. To solve those problems in the relations of the producing and collecting agencies which are submitted to it, in order that the full resources of the Government may be effectively concentrated on the most complete collection of vital intelligence.
- 4. After the functions described in paragraphs 3 a. and 3 b. above have been satisfactorily carried out, the Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination shall consult with the other intelligence agencies on the matter of submitting the statements of requirements to the IAC for approval.

ATTACHMENTS



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	28 September 1950	
	DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE	25X1A
	PRIORITY LIST OF CRITICAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES	
	In accordance with paragraph 3, the following list of critical national intelligence objectives, with respect to the USSR, is established; so the highest priority shall be given to the collection of information and to the production of intelligence concerning Soviet capabilities and intentions for:	25X1A
	 taking direct military action against the Continental United States; 	
	2. taking direct military action, employing USSR Armed Forces, against vital U. S. possessions, areas peripheral to the Soviet Union, and Western Europe;	
	3. interfering with U.S. strategic air attack;	
	4. interfering with U.S. movement of men and material by water transport;	
	5. production and stockpiling, including location of installations and facilities, of atomic and related weapons, other critical weapons and equipment, and critical transporta- tion equipment;	
	 creating situations anywhere in the world dangerous to U. S. national security, short of commitment of Soviet Armed Forces, including foreign directed sabotage and espionage objectives; 	
	7. interfering with U.S. political, psychological, and economic courses of action for the achievement of critical U.S. aims and objectives.	
	/s/	
	R. H. HILLENKOETTER Rear Admiral, USN Director of Central	

SECRET 25X1A 28 September 1950 Intelligence